military, and was therefore identified as the “ pacing threat.” This assessment was directly in line with the new White House National Security Strategy.

In his remarks, he emphasized that the strategy provided a “ clear-eyed appraisal” of America emerging from 20 years of “strategic atrophy” in which the Department of Defense’s “competitive military advantage has been eroding.” China topped the list of countries rapidly closing the gap on the U.S. Mattis’ visit to the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University focused on the release of the National Defense Strategy. They are also based on recent experiences implementing the 38th commandant’s vision while serving as a battalion and naval task unit commander for Task Force 61/2, a Marine-led organization within 6th Fleet dedicated to employing amphibious forces, including experimental reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance elements, in support of the fleet commander’s priorities in Europe and Africa. These observations and recommendations are based in part on my experience participating as a planner in the 36th and 37th commandants’ transformation efforts. Next, I describe Force Design 2030’ s primary objective based on this foundation while also addressing concerns raised by a group of senior retired marines, many of whom I have looked up to for decades, just as I have long admired Owen and his father, Bing West.įinally, I offer recommendations that I hope can help in bringing an end to the current internecine war over force design that is raking the Marine Corps. First, I explain the reforms’ logical, political, and strategic foundation that began with then-Defense Secretary James Mattis’ January 2018 speech at Johns Hopkins University, where he described the Department of Defense’s priorities changing from counterterrorism in the Middle East to great-power competition with China and Russia. I hope to provide some much-needed clarity to the ongoing force-design discussion by focusing on three matters.

David Berger’s detractors are missing the bigger picture and getting some of the facts and context of Force Design 2030 wrong. But this was one of many examples of selection bias in West’s article that left me convinced that Gen. War-making and car-making are, after all, different activities. This is not to say that the Marine Corps should be taking its cues from the auto industry.

The effort succeeded specifically because Ford’s chief executive officer, Henry Ford II, ultimately chose not to follow the recommended organizational change principles that West lays out in his article. I came away dissatisfied with the analogy and the article’s representation of Force Design 2030.Īround the same time as the Edsel and Mustang decisions, Ford embarked on a highly secretive and ultimately highly successful effort to build the GT40 to beat Ferrari at Le Mans. So it was with great interest that I clicked on an article by a fellow marine, Owen West, drawing lessons from the auto industry - the failure of the Edsel - for the commandant’s reforms of the Marine Corps. My grandfather raced at Le Mans and elsewhere, often driving Ford GT40s.

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